Modeling Behavior in Truth Value Judgment Task Experiments by Waldon, Brandon & Degen, Judith
Proceedings of the Society for Computation in Linguistics 
Volume 3 Article 3 
2020 
Modeling Behavior in Truth Value Judgment Task Experiments 
Brandon Waldon 
Stanford University, bwaldon@stanford.edu 
Judith Degen 
Stanford University, jdegen@stanford.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/scil 
 Part of the Computational Linguistics Commons, Psycholinguistics and Neurolinguistics Commons, 
and the Semantics and Pragmatics Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Waldon, Brandon and Degen, Judith (2020) "Modeling Behavior in Truth Value Judgment Task 
Experiments," Proceedings of the Society for Computation in Linguistics: Vol. 3 , Article 3. 
DOI: https://doi.org/10.7275/sg32-aq30 
Available at: https://scholarworks.umass.edu/scil/vol3/iss1/3 
This Paper is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in Proceedings of the Society for Computation in Linguistics by an authorized editor of 
ScholarWorks@UMass Amherst. For more information, please contact scholarworks@library.umass.edu. 
Modeling Behavior in Truth Value Judgment Task Experiments
Brandon Waldon
Stanford University
bwaldon@stanford.edu
Judith Degen
Stanford University
jdegen@stanford.edu
Abstract
Truth Value Judgment Task experiments
(TVJTs) are a common means of investigat-
ing pragmatic competence, particularly with
regards to scalar inference. We present a novel
quantitative linking function from pragmatic
competence to participant behavior on TVJTs,
based upon a Bayesian probabilistic model
of linguistic production. Our model captures
a range of observed phenomena on TVJTs,
including intermediate responses on a non-
binary scale, population and individual-level
variation, participant endorsement of false ut-
terances, and variation in response due to so-
called scalar diversity.
1 Introduction
In Truth Value Judgment Task experiments
(TJVTs), participants are asked whether a given
sentence is, e.g., ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ (or ‘true’ or
‘false’, etc.), often in a context of evaluation. In
the field of experimental pragmatics, participant
judgments in TVJT paradigms have been partic-
ularly important for investigating pragmatic com-
petence, especially as it relates to scalar implica-
ture (Noveck, 2001; Noveck and Posada, 2003;
Bott and Noveck, 2004; De Neys and Schaeken,
2007; Geurts and Pouscoulous, 2009; Chemla and
Spector, 2011; Degen and Goodman, 2014; De-
gen and Tanenhaus, 2015). On the traditional view
of pragmatic competence and its link to TVJT re-
sponses, scalar implicature is assumed - following
Grice (1975) - to be a binary and categorical phe-
nomenon, in the sense that a given utterance is as-
sumed to categorically either give rise to an impli-
cature or not, depending on contextual, cognitive,
and linguistic factors. To experimentalists oper-
ating on this assumption, a participant’s judgment
on a particular trial in a TVJT reflects whether or
not a scalar implicature was computed in context.
For example, a ‘wrong’ judgment of the sen-
tence John ate pizza or a sandwich, in a context in
which the stronger utterance alternative John ate
pizza and a sandwich is true and equally relevant,
is typically interpreted as a “pragmatic” judgment:
participants must have recognized that in such a
context, the or-sentence is true yet underinforma-
tive. Pragmatically enriching it to John didn’t eat
both pizza and a sandwich via scalar inference
makes it contextually false. Conversely, an answer
of ‘right’ on this view reflects a “literal” semantic
interpretation whereby the implicature is not com-
puted (i.e. John ate pizza or a sandwich - and pos-
sibly both).
This linking assumption underpins the vast ma-
jority of TVJT literature relating to scalar infer-
ence (Noveck, 2001; Papafragou and Musolino,
2003; Geurts and Pouscoulous, 2009; Doran et al.,
2012; Potts et al., 2015). In an early example, Pa-
pafragou and Musolino (2003) observe that chil-
dren accept true but underinformative sentences in
a TVJT at a relatively high rate relative to adults,
and that this rate is modulated by the particular
linguistic scale invoked on a given trial of the ex-
periment (i.e. some/all vs. finish/start vs. cardinal
numbers). The authors argue from this result that
scalar implicature computation is dependent upon
linguistic scale as well as on a child’s recognition
of the communicative goals of her interlocutor.
Though widely employed, this linking assump-
tion for TVJTs is associated with a host of prob-
lems discussed by Jasbi et al. (2019). Follow-
ing those authors as well as Tanenhaus (2004),
we take these open problems to be indicative of
a larger issue in linguistics, namely that the link-
ing hypotheses which bridge linguistic theory and
experimentally-elicited behavior are often under-
developed, underspecified, or (in some cases) ab-
sent in experimental studies. In the service of
providing a proof of concept for how this is-
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sue may be addressed by future researchers, we
propose and evaluate a novel account of partici-
pant response in TVJT paradigms based on an ex-
plicit and quantitatively specified linking function
rooted in a probabilistic theory of pragmatic com-
petence. The general idea is that participants’ re-
sponses in TVJT experiments are related to the
probability with which a cooperative pragmatic
speaker would have produced the observed utter-
ance (e.g., John ate pizza or a sandwich) in or-
der to communicate the meaning presented to par-
ticipants as fact (e.g., that John ate both pizza
and a sandwich). This probabilistic production
based view departs substantially from the previous
widespread assumption that truth-value judgments
are a measure of interpretation.
Before turning to the specifics of the account,
we briefly review some of the open problems in
the TVJT literature that motivate the re-thinking
of linking functions in TVJT paradigms:
Intermediate judgments: When provided
more than two response options in a TVJT, a siz-
able proportion of participants rates underinfor-
mative sentences using the intermediate response
options - for example, as only ‘kind of [right
/ wrong]’, or ‘neither [right nor wrong]’. Kat-
sos and Bishop (2011), for example, provided
participants with three response options and ob-
served substantial selection of the intermediate op-
tion. They interpreted the choice of this inter-
mediate option as being the result of the com-
putation of an implicature, but a priori, there is
no reason to favor this linking assumption over
one whereby the intermediate response is associ-
ated with a literal semantic interpretation. More
generally, it is not clear how the outputs of a bi-
nary model of scalar implicature (i.e. implicature
or ¬implicature) should relate to non-binary re-
sponses on TVJTs.
Population-level variation: In order to explain
behavioral variation in contexts where one expects
a scalar inference, an adherent to the categorical
view of scalar implicature must stipulate that a)
not all participants calculated the implicature; or
b) some participants who calculated the implica-
ture showed divergent behavior due to some in-
dependent mechanism which masked the ‘correct’
implicature behavior; or some combination of (a)
and (b). However, and despite the prevalence of
variation at the population level in reported TVJT
experiments, even a qualitative analysis of this
kind of variation is largely absent from the exper-
imental scalar implicature literature.
Scalar diversity: Doran et al. (2012), following
Papafragou and Musolino (2003) inter alia, report
that judgments of true but underinformative sen-
tences vary according to the particular linguistic
material contained within the sentence, in partic-
ular the relevant linguistic scale. They conclude
that variation among scalar implicatures is a func-
tion of the scale itself (see also van Tiel et al. 2014
for further support for scale-based scalar diversity
in a non-TVJT paradigm).
Whether this variation is truly due to inherent
features of the linguistic scale (or, e.g., prior world
knowledge, or other linguistic material, or other
confounding features of the experimental context)
is an open question which warrants investigation
beyond the scope of this paper. Below, we an-
alyze data from a TVJT where different rates of
exhaustive interpretation were observed between
a putative lexical scale (<and, or>) and a putative
ad-hoc, context-dependent pragmatic scale. Our
analysis of the data suggests that in this instance,
(at least some) variation at the level of linguistic
scale may be reduced to more general aspects of
pragmatic competence.
Endorsement of false utterances: Invariably,
a proportion of participants in TVJTs accepts
strictly false sentences. For example, in the study
we analyze below, a substantial number of par-
ticipants rated conjunctions A ^ B as partially
correct in contexts where only A was true. The
most common approaches to this type of data
are either to use it as the basis of an exclu-
sion criterion or to simply consider it meaning-
less noise. Doran et al. (2012), for example, ex-
clude participants whose performance deviates by
more than two standard deviations from the mean
response on ‘control’ sentences whose semantic
contents are consistent with the context of evalua-
tion (and which do not admit of potentially contra-
dictory pragmatic enrichments) or whose seman-
tic contents contradict the context. Katsos and
Bishop (2011) report that 2.5% of false sentences
in their experiment were endorsed by child partic-
ipants. On the standard linking assumption, these
data are difficult to make sense of, but we will
show that they are within the scope of a satisfac-
tory analysis of TVJT behavior.
The remainder of the paper is structured as fol-
lows: in Section 2, we summarize the results
11
Condition Response Options
Binary ‘Right’, ‘Wrong’
Ternary ‘Right’, ‘Neither’, ‘Wrong’
Quaternary ‘Right’, ‘Kinda Right’, ‘KindaWrong’,‘Wrong’
Quinary ‘Right’, ‘Kinda Right’, ‘Neither’, ‘KindaWrong’, ‘Wrong’
Table 1: Response-option conditions of Jasbi et
al. (2019)’s TVJT study.
of a recently reported TVJT study that exempli-
fies the features discussed above: intermediate
judgments, population-level variation, scalar di-
versity, and participant endorsement of false ut-
terances. Section 3 presents our novel quantita-
tive model of the data from that study. Building
on insights from the Bayesian probabilistic litera-
ture on pragmatic competence (Frank and Good-
man, 2012; Goodman and Stuhlmu¨ller, 2013), we
model participants as making judgments about a
soft-optimal pragmatic speaker whose production
choices are a function of utterances’ contextual in-
formativeness. On our analysis, participants fur-
thermore expect that the speaker sometimes pro-
duce strictly false utterances that are nonetheless
somewhat contextually useful. We show that this
analysis provides broader empirical coverage over
the traditional assumptions discussed above.1
2 TVJT Data
2.1 Experiment Materials, Design and
Procedure
Jasbi et al. (2019) report the results of a TVJT de-
signed to test whether linking hypothesis and num-
ber of response options modulate the researcher’s
inferences about scalar implicature rates. In their
study, number of response options varied between
two and five as a between-subjects manipulation.
Conditions are summarized in Figure 1. Partici-
pants (n = 200) were first shown six cards (Table
2) featuring one or two of the following animals: a
cat, a dog, and an elephant. On every trial, partic-
ipants saw one of the six cards, and a blindfolded
cartoon character Bob made guesses as to what an-
imals were on the card. Participants were asked
to rate Bob’s guesses using the response options
available in their particular condition.
Bob made the following guess types: simple
declaratives (e.g., There is a cat), conjunctions
(e.g., There is a cat and a dog), and disjunctions
1Data and code for all analyses and graphs are available
at http://github.com/bwaldon/tvjt_linking.
Table 2: Cards used in Jasbi et al. (2019)’s TVJT.
(e.g., There is a cat or a dog). Card types were
crossed with guess types in this study such that a
card containing an animal X could be presented
with a guess of There is an X, There is an X or a Y
(where Y is some animal distinct from X), There is
an X and a Y, or There is a Y; cards containing two
animals X and Y could be presented with a guess
of There is an X, There is an X or a Y, There is an
X and a Y, or There is a Z (where Z is some animal
distinct from X and Y).
The researchers elicited 3 judgments per partic-
ipant for each combination of card and guess type.
2.2 Results and Discussion
Proportions of responses for each card-guess type
in each response-option condition are shown in
Figure 1, with rows presenting behavior aggre-
gated across one and two-card conditions.
The results of the study illustrate the sev-
eral open empirical issues associated with TVJTs
more generally. First, participants routinely re-
ported intermediate judgments between ‘Right’
and ‘Wrong’ in those conditions where intermedi-
ate response options were available. In the Qua-
ternary and Quinary response-option conditions,
for example, the intermediate judgment of ‘Kinda
Right’ was the single most-selected response op-
tion in two-animal card conditions where Bob’s
guess was true but underinformative (i.e. either
a simple delcarative or a disjunction).
The results also exemplify the issue of
population-level variation: for example, al-
though behavioral patterns are otherwise fairly
categorical in the Binary condition, participant
judgments were roughly split between ‘Right’ and
‘Wrong’ for underinformative uses of disjunc-
tion on two-animal card conditions. A visual in-
spection of the results suggests even more varia-
tion in the population as number of response op-
tions increase. The authors furthermore reported
individual-level variation: qualitatively similar
trials (e.g. two trials involving underinforma-
tive disjunction) sometimes received different re-
12
Figure 1: Model predictions (light bars) plotted against empirical results (dark bars) from Jasbi et al.’s (2019)
TVJT study. Error bars indicate 95% multinomial confidence intervals. Red and green bars indicate false and true
trials, respectively; blue bars indicate implicature trials.
sponses from the same participant.
Comparison of judgments of true but underin-
formative simple declaratives (i.e. There is an X)
to judgments of true but underinformative disjunc-
tions (i.e. There is an X or a Y) on two-animal
card conditions revealed some amount of scalar
diversity. Following Horn (1972), exposure to the
disjunctive connective or canonically activates an
informationally-stronger scalemate and as a prag-
matic alternative to give rise to an exclusive in-
terpretation. In contrast, the pragmatic scale in
the case of the simple declarative is constructed
in a more context-dependent manner. To illus-
trate, in a two-animal card context where the card
features both a cat and a dog, the listener consid-
ers a partially-ordered pragmatic scale of cat and
dog, cat, and dog, where the conjunction outranks
its scalemates in terms of informational strength.
Thus, an utterance of cat activates cat and dog as
an alternative to give rise to an the exhaustive in-
terpretation (There is only a cat on the card).
In the Binary and Ternary conditions, under-
informative uses of or resulted in substantially
higher rates of ‘Wrong’ responses than did under-
informative simple declaratives, suggesting that
at the population level, or was interpreted more
exhaustively than the simple declarative. How-
ever, this pattern was reversed in the Quaternary
and Quinary conditions, in which underinforma-
tive simple declaratives were more likely to be
considered only ‘Kinda Right’ and less likely to be
considered simply ‘Right’ compared to underin-
formative disjunctions. This pattern suggests that
in the Quaternary and Quinary conditions, simple
declaratives were interpreted more exhaustively
than disjunctions.
Finally, the data in the Quaternary and Quinary
conditions also reveal substantial participant en-
dorsement of false utterances. Note specifi-
cally that in one-animal card trials, the conjunctive
guess (e.g. cat and dog) is strictly false; thus, we
might naı¨vely expect a priori that participants cat-
egorically judge these utterances to be ‘Wrong’ in
all conditions. Yet when given the option to rate
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this sentence ‘Kinda Right’ or ‘Kinda Wrong’,
participants often did so. In all other conditions
where the utterance was strictly false (e.g. a guess
of elephant for a card containing a cat or a cat and
dog), behavior was effectively categorical. That is,
rates of endorsement of false utterances varied ac-
cording to the particular way in which the sentence
was false in context.
In sum, the data collected by Jasbi et al. (2019)
reflect a range of behavioral patterns unaccounted
for by the traditional categorical view of scalar
inference and corresponding standard linking as-
sumptions. Below, we report an analysis of their
data that aims to predict these phenomena.
3 Analysis
3.1 Cognitive model
Our analysis implements a proposal outlined by
Jasbi et al. (2019), couched in the Rational
Speech Act (RSA) framework (Frank and Good-
man, 2012; Goodman and Stuhlmu¨ller, 2013).
RSA provides a Bayesian, probabilistic account
of pragmatic competence. In RSA, the pragmatic
inferences drawn by listeners are represented as
probability distributions over meanings which the
speaker plausibly intended to convey with a given
observed utterance. The probability of this lis-
tener (L1) attributing an intended meaning m to a
speaker who produces an utterance u is calculated
from a prior probability distribution over potential
world states Pw as well as from L1’s expectations
about the linguistic behavior of the speaker S1.
PL1(m|u) / PS1(u|m) · Pw(m)
PS1 is modeled as a probability distribution over
possible utterances given the speaker’s commu-
nicative intentions m. This speaker produces ut-
terances that soft-maximize utility, where utility
is defined via a tradeoff between an utterance’s
cost C and its contextual informativeness, calcu-
lated from the representation of a literal listenerL0
whose interpretation of an utterance u is in turn a
function of the truth conditional meaning [[u]](m)
and of her prior expectations Pw(m) regarding the
likelihood of possible world states. The extent to
which the speaker maximizes utility is modulated
by a parameter ↵ – the greater ↵, the more the
speaker produces utterances that maximize utility.
PS1(u|m) / e↵(lnL0(m|u) C(u))
PL0(m|u) / [[u]](m) · Pw(m)
In RSA (and contra the traditional view), prag-
matic inferences are not categorical computations
of enriched meanings over the semantic denota-
tions of utterances. For example, exclusive inter-
pretations of or are represented in RSA as a pos-
itive shift in the posterior probability of an exclu-
sive meaning, relative to its prior probability.
In other words, ‘implicature’ is not a theoreti-
cal construct in the RSA framework, absent addi-
tional stipulations regarding how to go from prob-
ability distributions to binary, categorical infer-
ences. This is an advantage: providing a proba-
bilistic representation of both the speaker’s utter-
ance choices and the listener’s resulting posterior
beliefs after observing an utterance puts us one
step closer to accounting for the quantitative be-
havioral patterns observed in tasks such as TVJTs.
3.2 Behavioral model
Jasbi et al. (2019) proposed but did not system-
atically test a simple linking hypothesis: rather
than providing one response if an implicature is
computed and another if it isn’t, a participant in
a TVJT experiment provides a particular response
to an utterance u if the probability of u given a
meaning represented by m lies within a particular
probability interval on the distribution PS1(u|m).2
The participant is modeled as a responder R, who
in a binary forced-choice task between ‘Right’
and ‘Wrong’ responds ‘Right’ to an utterance u in
world m just in case PS1(u|m) meets or exceeds
some probability threshold ✓:
R(u,m, ✓) =
(
‘Right’ iff PS1(u|m)   ✓
‘Wrong’ otherwise
The model is extended straightforwardly to an
experiment in which participants have a third re-
sponse option (e.g. ‘Neither’), as in the Ternary
condition. In this case, the model specifies two
probability thresholds: ✓1, the minimum standard
for an utterance in a given world state to count as
‘Right’, and ✓2, the minimum standard for ‘Nei-
ther’. Thus, in the Ternary condition:
R(u,m, ✓) =
8><>:
‘Right’ iff PS1(u|m)   ✓1
‘Neither’ iff ✓1 > PS1(u|m)   ✓2
‘Wrong’ otherwise
Applying a similar logic allows for the speci-
fication of linking hypotheses for TVJTs with an
2Following Degen and Goodman (2014), the authors ar-
gue that conceptually, behavior on TVJTs is better modeled
as a function of an agent’s representation of a pragmatic
speaker rather than of a pragmatic listener.
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arbitrary number of response options.
The intuition behind the threshold model is as
follows: participants should disprefer utterances
that are relatively unexpected. Thus, high S1 pro-
duction probability for a given utterance in context
makes it more likely that the utterance receives a
positive evaluation in the TVJT – expressed by
ordered response options above ‘Wrong’. Con-
versely, the more unexpected an utterance is, the
more likely it is to be judged as ‘Wrong’. Underin-
formative utterances of the sort that have tradition-
ally been used to assess ‘implicature rates’ are pre-
cisely the kinds of utterances that are unexpected
from informative speakers and are therefore likely
to be rated as ‘Wrong’.
Here, we assess the quality of this linking hy-
pothesis on the dataset from Jasbi et al. (2019).
To that end, we first specify the space of possi-
ble meanings and utterances that inform a partici-
pant’s pragmatic competence in this task. We as-
sume that participants have uniform prior expecta-
tions of seeing any of the six possible cards in the
experiment. We further assume that participants
have uniform prior expectations of a speaker pro-
ducing any of the four utterance types with which
a card may have been crossed. For example, if
the card featured either just a cat or both a cat and
a dog, we represent the participant as having uni-
form prior expectations of a speaker producing the
guesses elephant, cat, dog, cat and dog, or cat or
dog (that is, we do not posit a cost asymmetry be-
tween possible utterances).3
For illustrative purposes, the ‘Simple Bayesian’
bars in Figure 2 display marginal distributions
over possible utterances produced by S1 given
these assumptions for the utterance and meanings
priors, as well as an arbitary value of 1 for the op-
timality parameter ↵, and given that the speaker
intends either to communicate the meaning that
(just) a cat is on the card or that both a cat and
a dog are. The speaker distributions reveal two
conceptual issues for the threshold response model
proposed by Jasbi et al (2019).
First, the probability of S1 producing the strictly
false guess of cat and dog should be zero if the
card contains just a cat. This is because the lit-
eral listener probability PL0 of inferring the ‘only
cat’ meaning given cat and dog is zero by virtue
3We include dog as a possible guess because we posit
that participants have no reason a priori to expect the other
true and underinformative simple declarative - cat - over this
equally informative guess in two-animal card conditions.
of the fact that the utterance is strictly false in this
world state. Thus, any model of response that is
a function of PS1 as specified predicts that partic-
ipants categorically rate the cat and dog guess as
‘Wrong’ in this context, contrary to what is ob-
served in the Quaternary and Quinary conditions.
Second, the probability of producing disjunc-
tions is lower than the probability of produc-
ing simple declarative guesses in two-animal card
contexts. This asymmetry is advantageous in
the case of the Binary and Ternary response
data: assuming a threshold for ‘Right’ posi-
tioned between PS1(cat or dog|cat and dog) and
PS1(cat|cat and dog), we predict correctly that
underinformative simple declaratives should be
judged ‘Right’ more often than underinformative
disjunctions. But the asymmetry in S1 probabil-
ities therefore predicts the wrong pattern of re-
sponses on corresponding trials in the Quaternary
and Quinary conditions.
We argue that these two seemingly disparate
issues can be mediated by a common solution.
In particular, we propose a revision to the sim-
ple Bayesian inference story above, whereby
pragmatically-competent listeners either expect
speaker productions as directly sampled from the
PS1 distribution, or that those utterance production
probabilities inform a second conditional proba-
bility distribution of utterances given utterances,
the ‘Partial Truth’ utterance distribution PSPT :
PSPT (u
0|u) / P
m2JuKPS1(u0|m)4
The ‘Partial Truth’ distribution is a generalized
way of modeling a speaker who makes assertions
that are sometimes strictly false in light of her in-
tended meaning. Recall that the semantic con-
tent of any possible utterance choice made by S1
is a set of possible worlds and is therefore con-
sistent with meanings unintended by the speaker.
SPT models the speaker’s soft-optimal produc-
tion probabilities given these unintended mean-
ings, renormalizing the pragmatic speaker’s pro-
duction probabilities over all possible worlds con-
sistent with utterance choices sampled from PS1 .
4For our implementation of SPT , we restrict the distribu-
tion such that u0 must entail (or be entailed by) u in order to
have probability above 0. Without this restriction, SPT could
in principle assign high probability to utterances which have
no relevance to the question under discussion (i.e. “What ani-
mals are on the card?”), by virtue of those utterances’ asserta-
bility in worlds consistent with u. A systematic exploration
of the linguistic alternatives available to S1 (as well as SPT )
is a question we must leave to future work.
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Figure 2: Simulated S1 production probabilities.
To illustrate: suppose a speaker intends to com-
municate that many (but not all) of the X are Y,
and has quantifier choices many and all. The only
possible utterance choice for the simple Bayesian
S1 speaker is many, which is semantically consis-
tent with the intended meaning. But the lower-
bounded quantifier many is also semantically con-
sistent with an ‘all of the X are Y’ meaning, which
in turn is consistent with the utterance choice all.
By SPT , we have some nonzero expectation that
the speaker will use all to communicate the ‘many
(but not all) of the X are Y’ meaning.5 Thus, a
pragmatic listener who hears all from the ‘Par-
tial Truth’ speaker will have a nonzero expectation
that all should receive an imprecise, non-maximal
interpretation. In other words, SPT provides a
generalized way of formalizing ‘loose-talk’ pro-
duction behavior (Lasersohn, 1999).6
The ‘Partial Truth’ bars in Figure 2 visual-
ize marginal distributions over utterances given
an arbitrary 0.6 probability that the speaker sam-
ples from the PSPT distribution after sampling
from PS1 . The ‘Partial Truth’ speaker assigns
nonzero probability to a guess of cat and dog
even when the speaker’s intended meaning is the
single-animal cat card, largely due to the fact that
the optimal guess in this context (cat) is truth-
conditionally consistent with a two-animal card
that makes cat and dog both true and pragmat-
ically optimal.7 Moreover, this speaker assigns
5The effect of this is similar to the use of QUD projection
functions for hyperbolic interpretations (Kao et al., 2014).
6Formalizing this production behavior is different from
analyzing why imprecision exists (indeed, is pervasive) in lin-
guistic communication. For the time being, we present this
‘loose-talk’ speaker model without a thorough assessment of
its explanatory power.
7Because cat or dog is a possible S1 production, and this
choice lies in an entailment relation with the simple declar-
greater probability to a guess of cat or dog in two-
animal contexts and down-weights the probability
of producing simply cat: the optimal utterance in
this context (cat and dog) is consistent with sev-
eral world states in which the disjunction cat or
dog is assertable and with relativley fewer worlds
in which cat is assertable.
3.3 Quantitative model evaluation
We now turn to a quantitative assessment of the
threshold model of response, having addressed
two ways in which the unenriched S1 represen-
tation would fail to qualitatively capture behav-
ioral patterns in Jasbi et al (2019)’s TVJT study.
Additionally, following Jasbi et al., we recognize
that if threshold values were made to be com-
pletely invariant across trials of the experiment,
then the model would make the undesirable pre-
diction that every participant should have exactly
the same response in a given trial type. To allow
for population-level variation, the model respon-
der makes a response by comparing the speaker
probability against thresholds that are generated
from sampling from Gaussian distributions. We
thus allow for both population-level and individual
level-variation, on the assumption that this sam-
pling procedure takes place whenever a participant
is asked to evaluate an utterance in the TVJT.8
In order to evaluate the RSA-based thresh-
old model, we conducted a Bayesian data analy-
sis. This allowed us to simultaneously generate
model predictions and infer likely parameter val-
ues, by conditioning on the TVJT data from Jasbi
et al. (separately for each of the four response-
option conditions of the experiment) and integrat-
ing over the free parameters. Each model assumes
uniform priors over utterances and world states as
above. We infer the Gaussian threshold distribu-
tion parameters and alpha optimality parameters
from uniform priors over parameter values using
MCMC sampling (observing - for every sample
of possible parameter values the expected propor-
tion of responses in that trial type and comparing
that distribution to the empirically-observed pat-
tern of response).9 Additionally, for the Quater-
ative guess dog, we also assign some probability to dog as a
guess in this context - albeit lower probability than is assigned
to the conjunctive guess cat and dog.
8We also introduce a random noise term in the parameter
estimation such that the simulated responder makes random
guesses on 1% of trials. This noise term is removed when
running the model forward to make predictive estimations.
9We used WebPPL (Goodman and Stuhlmu¨ller, 2014) for
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Binary condition
↵   µ✓1
1.22 0.125 0.073
Ternary condition
↵   µ✓1 µ✓2
1.38 0.076 0.061 0.011
Quaternary condition
↵   µ✓1 µ✓2 µ✓3 PT
2.75 0.159 0.277 0.101 0.048 0.797
Quinary condition
↵   µ✓1 µ✓2 µ✓3 µ✓4 PT
4.38 0.099 0.184 0.042 0.005 0.002 0.437
Table 3: MAP estimates obtained from Bayesian data
analysis, where ↵ is the optimality parameter,   and
µ are Gaussian threshold distribution parameters, and
PT is the probability with which the speaker samples
from PSPT rather than directly from PS1 .
nary and Quinary conditions, we infer from a uni-
form prior the probability with which the speaker
samples from PSPT after sampling from PS1 . The
intuition for restricting the ‘Partial Truth’ manipu-
lation to these conditions is that the behavioral pat-
terns which this manipulation is intended to cover
are only observed in these conditions.10
Posterior distributions over the parameter val-
ues are displayed in Figure 3, and model pre-
dictions using maximum a posteriori (MAP) esti-
mates of the parameter values (Table 3) are plot-
ted against Jasbi et al. (2019)’s results in Fig-
ure 1. Qualitatively, the model addresses each of
the desiderata for an empirically adequate linking
function discussed above. In all conditions, the
model makes predictions for the full range of re-
sponse options available to participants – thus ad-
dressing the issue of intermediate judgments. At
the same time, the model addresses the issue of
population-level variation: sampling threshold
values from Gaussian distributions allows differ-
ent judgments in the population for a given utter-
ance (while keeping the speaker production prob-
ability of that utterance constant).
Recall that in the Quaternary and Quinary con-
ditions, there was an asymmetry in the judgment
of underinformative disjunctions versus underin-
MCMC inference, with 5000 samples (plus a lag of 10 iter-
ations between samples) and a burn-in time of 20,000 itera-
tions. We computed maximum a posteriori values from the
marginal posterior distributions over parameter values using
the density function in R.
10We speculate that there may be a link between increasing
the number of response options and participants’ increased
expectation of Partial Truth speaker behavior, which may
have been strengthened by the fact that the Quaternary and
Quinary conditions explicitly made reference to gradient lev-
els of correctness (i.e. ‘Kinda Right’ / ‘Kinda Wrong’). But
this speculation warrants future investigation.
formative simple declaratives. The model makes
use of the ‘Partial Truth’ speaker function in order
to adjust the underlying speaker production proba-
bilities - and hence the distribution of predicted re-
sponse options - for these utterances. The ‘Partial
Truth’ function also boosts the production prob-
ability of strictly false conjunctions, allowing the
model to predict responses other than ‘Wrong’ for
this trial type. Thus, the ‘Partial Truth’ enrich-
ment helps to address both scalar diversity and
endorsement of false utterances.11
The correlation between empirical observations
and model predictions is high (Adj. R2 > 0.9
in all conditions), suggesting that the threshold
responder model is a good model of TVJT be-
havior overall. Nevertheless, the model makes
some undesirable predictions. For example, it
over-predicts rates of ‘Neither’ responses in the
Quinary condition. Empirically, this response
tended to be disfavored relative to positive and
negative response options, for example in the case
of strictly false cat and dog guesses. The model
assumes that the labeling of the response options
should have no particular effect on selection, but
future work should engage with this assumption.
4 Discussion and Conclusion
Based on a single underlying probabilistic model
of pragmatic competence, the presented thresh-
old responder model provides a level of empiri-
cal coverage for TVJT data unavailable to existing
linking models rooted in the categorical view of
scalar implicature. The contribution of this paper
is twofold: methodologically, we present this anal-
ysis as a proof-of-concept approach to modeling
TVJT data for researchers in experimental seman-
tics/pragmatics. We see the presented behavioral
model as a starting point for future quantitative an-
alytic work in the TVJT domain – a model against
which future models may be assessed.12
On the theoretical side, the cognitive model that
forms the basis for the behavioral model is non-
neutral in its assumptions. In particular, it as-
sumes that TVJT behavior is the result of rea-
soning about probabilistic utterance choices that
11We leave further investigation of the ‘Partial Truth’ func-
tion - in particular its extension to an analysis of linguistic
imprecision as sketched above - to future work.
12For example, one could in principle link the thresh-
old model to pragmatic listener probabilities of meanings
given utterances rather than to speaker production probabili-
ties given intended meanings (as we do in this paper).
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Figure 3: Normalized marginal posterior distributions over parameter values for the threshold responder model in
each experimental condition. Note that the posterior distribution for the optimality parameter ↵ has been rescaled
for the purposes of this visualization.
are the result of trading off (contextual) utterance
informativeness and cost. Under this view, not
only does TVJT behavior not quantify implica-
ture rates; the very notion of an implicature evap-
orates. Rather than finding this undesirable, we
believe that this framework allows for more rigor-
ous engagement with the complexities of linking
theoretical constructs to behavior (see also Franke
2016), an area of some dearth in experimental se-
mantics/pragmatics.
—
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